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Note
Killing the Goose That Laid the Golden Egg:
Outdated Employment Laws Are Destroying the
Gig Economy
Emily C. Atmore∗
A college student trying to alleviate steep tuition costs in
between an erratic class schedule. A single mother saving for a
trip to Disney World with her five-year-old daughter. A salesman
subleasing his empty condo while he travels across the country.
A retiree looking for a productive activity to fill long days. A stayat-home mom with a lucrative knack for knitting.
What do all of these people have in common? They are your
Uber and Lyft drivers, Airbnb hosts, Instacart shoppers, and
Etsy shop owners. They are your neighbors, friends, and family.
They are the independent workforce. There are roughly fifty-four
million of them (and counting) and they comprise the gig economy. 1
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friends and family for cheering me on from near and far. Most importantly, a
heartfelt thank you to my parents, Robert Atmore and Carolyn Cole, for their
unwavering support and endless encouragement in law school and in everything
else I do. Copyright © 2017 by Emily C. Atmore.
1. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE, NECESSITY
AND THE GIG ECONOMY 3 (Oct. 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/
employment-and-growth/independent-work-choice-necessity-and-the-gig
-economy (“Overall, our research suggests that there are 54 million to 68 million
independent earners in the United States . . . .”); Stephane Kasriel, No, We
Won’t All Be Freelancers in the Future of Work, FAST CO. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://
www.fastcompany.com/40484760/no-we-wont-all-be-freelancers-in-the-future
-of-work (“Over 57 million Americans took on freelance work in some capacity
[in 2017]—that’s 36% of the U.S. workforce, up from 53 million in 2014.”).
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The gig economy is the popular name given to the new world
of work: flexible, exciting jobs that unleash innovation and promote economic growth. 2 These jobs are aptly labeled “gigs.” 3
They are characterized by their flexible, autonomous, and shortterm nature.4 The gig economy is also known for its innovative
use of websites or mobile applications to connect gig workers directly with customers, producing better services at lower prices.5
Despite its growing appeal, the gig economy is threatened
by a web of legal complications. 6 Most notably, gig workers are
not often or easily classified as employees under federal and
state employment laws. 7 When workers are not classified as employees, by default, they are classified as independent contractors. This classification limits these workers’ access to traditional employment benefits such as minimum wage and
overtime pay, protection against discrimination, workplace
safety regulations, payroll tax contributions, unemployment insurance, social security, disability insurance, Medicare, workers
compensation insurance, health insurance, and retirement savings plans.8 The difference in designation between an employee
2. See John Gapper, New ‘Gig’ Economy Spells End to Lifetime Careers,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/ab492ffc-3522-11e5-b05b
-b01debd57852 (“‘[The gig economy] is creating exciting economies and unleashing innovation . . . .’” (quoting Hillary Clinton)). The name sharing economy is
also commonly used interchangeably with gig economy.
3. The term gig originated in popularity in the 1950s to refer to a job or
task in which one was not necessarily invested, but simply took to pay the bills.
This term was used in contrast to a real job, meaning the lifelong nine-to-five
salaried desk job with a benefits package that became the prevalent form of
employment in this era. Geoff Nunberg, Commentary, Goodbye Jobs, Hello
‘Gigs’: How One Word Sums Up a New Economic Reality, NPR (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/11/460698077/goodbye-jobs-hello-gigs-nunbergs
-word-of-the-year-sums-up-a-new-economic-reality.
4. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 1, at 2.
5. Will Rinehart, The Modern Online Gig Economy, Consumer Benefits,
and the Importance of Regulatory Humility, AM. ACTION F. (Nov. 19, 2015),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/the-modern-online-gig
-economy-consumer-benefit-and-the-importance-of-regula (“[C]onsumers have
flocked to these networked services because of the added convenience, lower
prices, and higher quality services.”).
6. See Gapper, supra note 2 (“‘[The gig economy] is also raising hard questions about workplace protections and what a good job will look like in [the]
future.’” (quoting Hillary Clinton)).
7. See Nunberg, supra note 3 (“[I]n the future, work will be less secure but
lots more exciting. We can make our own schedule and hours, pick the projects
that interest us, work from anywhere and try our hands at different trades.”).
8. See Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker ” 7 (The
Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2015-10, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/
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and an independent contractor hinges on employment classification tests that were drafted during the Industrial Revolution
with the traditional worker in mind. Today’s gig workers “do not
seem to fit into either of the binary worker categories—though
far from traditional employees, they also bear little resemblance
to [the] independent, small-business-operating contractors” that
were originally envisioned. 9 Gig workers are “square pegs” being
forced to fit into employee classification tests consisting of “two
round holes.” 10 And existing employment law “provides nothing
remotely close to a clear answer” to this problem. 11
There is widespread value in resolving employee misclassification issues: when workers are incorrectly classified, all parties suffer. 12 Workers are potentially denied rights and benefits
that legislators have always been extremely careful to protect. 13
Employers, though they may benefit from cost savings of misclassification,14 are financially threatened by legal retribution. 15
Congress loses billions in tax revenue 16 and courts suffer from
ResourcesAndTools/legal-and-compliance/employment-law/Documents/
modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.
9. Jennifer Pinsof, Note, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV.
341, 344 (2016).
10. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (2015) (“[T]he jury in this
case will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round
holes.”).
11. Id. at 1082.
12. Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors, U.S. DEP’T
OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification (last visited Nov.
30, 2017) (“ The misclassification of employees as independent contractors presents one of the most serious problems facing affected workers, employers and
the entire economy.”).
13. DEP’T FOR PROF. EMPLOYEES, MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES AS
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 1 (2016), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/
Misclassification-of-Employees-2016.pdf [hereinafter MISCLASSIFICATION OF
EMPLOYEES] (“ The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates that employers
have misclassified millions of workers nationally as independent contractors.”).
14. Id. at 3 (“[T]ax savings, as well as savings from income and Medicare
taxes results in employers saving between 20 to 40 percent on labor costs.”). For
a list of other advantages, see id. For a breakdown of Uber ’s potential cost increases, see Stephen Gandel, Uber-nomics: Here’s What It Would Cost Uber to
Pay Its Drivers as Employees, FORTUNE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/
2015/09/17/ubernomics.
15. Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to
Death, FAST CO. (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/
the-gig-economy-wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death (“ This rising legal
retribution is a huge threat to the gig economy.”).
16. NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES
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inefficiency and uncertainty. 17 The rise of the gig economy has
exacerbated the detrimental effects of misclassification, making
it imperative that employment statutes are reviewed and the
confusing tests that define them are revised. Until this occurs,
lawsuits will continue to be filed, gig workers will continue to be
denied protections, and gig companies will go bankrupt.
This Note argues that current employment laws do not adequately embrace gig economy workers, and create dangerous obstacles to needed economic growth. It urges the necessary implementation of an immediate solution that properly balances and
protects the interests of entrepreneurial business owners and independent workers. Part I presents a historical overview of employment law in the United States and outlines the development
of the gig economy. Part II analyzes the improper application of
employee classification factors to independent workers and discusses the underlying tension between promoting economic
growth and protecting individual interests. Part III advocates for
comprehensive legal reform to preserve economic opportunity,
promote economic efficiency, and protect economic security. Ultimately, Part III proposes the implementation of a temporary
safe harbor to protect gig companies from the detrimental liability of employee misclassification, while reexamining both existing employee classification tests and the long-term separation of
welfare benefits from employment altogether.
I. EXAMINING THE GIG ECONOMY’S CLASH WITH
EMPLOYMENT LAWS
While employment law has been developing for several centuries and the modern gig economy is commonly considered to
have only developed in the last decade,18 the present difficulties
in employee misclassification illuminate an unresolved funda-

2 (July 22, 2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Independent-Contractor
-Costs.pdf (“State and federal governments lose billions in revenues annually.”).
This impact will not be further discussed in this Note.
17. Alan B. Krueger, Modernizing Labor Laws in the Online Gig Economy,
HAMILTON PROJECT 7 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/
assets/files/labor_laws_gig_economy_krueger_harris_transcript_12-9-2015.pdf
(“[Gig] relationships fall into this gray area. And that’s creating a tremendous
amount of legal uncertainty, inefficiency and costs in our system today . . . .”).
18. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 10 box 2.
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mental clash between employee protection and economic development. 19 This Part presents the current legal interaction between employment laws and the modern economy. Section A examines the origin of the employer-employee relationship,
describes the development of employment law, and outlines the
modern day employee classification tests: the common law control test and the economic realities test. Section B provides an
in-depth introduction to the gig economy and its central differences from the traditional workforce model. Section C reviews
historic and current clashes between employment law and economic development. This Part establishes that existing employment laws are unable to effectively support the gig economy.
A. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION
TESTS
Employment law developed as a result of a legislative push
for employee protections that became most prominent during the
Industrial Revolution. 20 It was at this time that the historical
master-servant relationship was complicated by an “explosion of
new occupations and ways of organizing work [which ultimately]
shattered this simplicity.” 21 Industrialization created what has
been deemed the traditional workforce: salaried workers with a
forty-hour work week in lifetime-long manufacturing careers.
This refined work structure created an array of social and legal
complications for vulnerable employees and gave immense
power to employers.22 In response, legislators became chiefly
concerned with elevating individual workers’ rights and curtailing employer power amidst the rampantly growing industrial
landscape.

19. See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1514 (2016) (“ The current context may be new,
but the difficulty of classifying workers long predates the on-demand economy.
More than seventy years ago, the Supreme Court concluded that, ‘[f ]ew problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results
than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employeremployee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial
dealing.’” (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944))).
20. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It
Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295,
301 (2001).
21. Id. at 303.
22. Id. at 306 (“[Worker insecurity] became more obvious as employment
relations became less domestic and paternalistic, and grew more industrial,
complex and impersonal.”).
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Since that time, numerous laws have been implemented to
restrain employer power over employees, protect employees from
employer discrimination, and serve to entice workers to remain
employed with their employers.23 These laws provide access to
fair wages and pay, unemployment insurance, social security
benefits, disability insurance, workers insurance, health insurance, and retirement savings plans. 24 Because these laws are intended to govern the employer-employee relationship, they are
activated only upon creation of an employer-employee relationship. This dynamic has created a critical difference between the
definition of employee and nonemployees, or independent contractors. Independent contractors are distinguished from employees by their autonomous nature; they contract with employers to perform work under a specific set of conditions (that is, for
a specific task, duration, or intended result) but “retain independence and self-management over their performance.”25 The
distinction between employee and independent contractor has
become vital to determining to whom many legal protections and
benefits are owed. 26 Definitions vary between statutes, but are
frequently written so broadly as to provide no worthwhile definition at all. 27 Legislative ambiguity left the task of defining the
scope of employment to the courts. 28
In an attempt to create applicable distinctions between employees and independent contractors, courts initially sought
guidance from the original master-servant relationship.29 Two

23. See generally Carlson, supra note 20, at 304 (outlining the development
of employment law).
24. Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 7.
25. Richard R. Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law
Regulation of Alternative Worker Relations, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 661, 663 (1996);
see Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 7 (“Independent contractors control the
methods and means of the work they perform for others, make significant capital investments, possibly employ others, and retain the opportunity for profit or
loss.”).
26. Carlson, supra note 20, at 301.
27. See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[The
Act contains] no definition that solves problems as to the limits of the employeremployee relationship.” (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722,
728 (1947))).
28. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (“We
have often been asked to construe the meaning of ‘employee’ where the statute
containing the term does not helpfully define it.”).
29. Carlson, supra note 20, at 304.
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tests emerged: the control test, 30 followed eventually by the economic realities test.31 While there are many factors that courts
consider as a part of each of these tests, the central focus of each
test is clearly control and independence: the control the employer
has over the worker versus the level of independence the worker
has from the employer. 32 Some courts have argued that these
tests are so similar that “there is no functional difference between the . . . formulations.” 33 Over time, courts at both the state
and federal level have also applied hybrid analyses that combine
the elements of each of these tests.34 A myriad of judicial interpretations, along with statutory vagueness, has created significant confusion as to the correct employment classification of
workers and the existence of related legal rights.

30. See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 662 (2013) (“ The common law ‘control test’ comes out
of the original conceptions of master and servant from pre-industrial English
law, and the Supreme Court has used this test as the default definition of the
term ‘employee’ in federal statutes.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220 (1958) (defining a servant as essentially synonymous with an
employee).
31. For detailed charts laying out the differences between the common law
control test and the economic realities test, see Charles J. Muhl, What is an
Employee? The Answer Depends on the Federal Law, 125 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
3, 6 exhibit 1 (2002).
32. The more control a company has over a worker and the more dependent
the worker is on the company, the more likely a worker will be classified as an
employee. Control and independence are the two main factors that this Note
will analyze in Part II, infra.
33. Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010);
see also Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999);
Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 20 F.3d
938, 941–42 (9th Cir. 1994).
34. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing
the analysis that has become known as the hybrid test); see also Frankel v.
Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1993) (recognizing the “wider trend” to
apply the hybrid test); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985)
(applying the hybrid test). For a more thorough explanation of the hybrid test,
see Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case
for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 250–52 (1997). Because use of hybrid control and economic realities tests varies significantly between jurisdictions, these
variations will not be explored in detail in this Note.
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1. Common Law Control Test
The control test is based on agency law. 35 Courts have created a presumption that this interpretation applies unless Congress specifically indicates otherwise.36 This test is focused on
defining an employer’s “right to control” the work of his employees. 37 It consists of ten factors, none of which are to be emphasized more than any other. 38 These factors are: (1) control; (2)
supervision; (3) integration; (4) skill level; (5) continuing relationship; (6) tools and location; (7) method of payment; (8) intent;
(9) employment by more than one company; and (10) type of business. 39 A court will use these factors to determine whether the
relationship is that of an employee or an independent contractor:
“an employer controls the details of an employee’s work, but only
the results of a[n independent] contractor’s work.” 40
35. See Bodie, supra note 30, at 713.
36. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 318 (1992)
(“Where a statute containing that term does not helpfully define it, this Court
presumes that Congress means an agency law definition unless it clearly indicates otherwise.”).
37. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (“ This right of control need not extend to every possible detail of the work.
Rather, the relevant question is whether the entity retains ‘all necessary control’ over the worker ’s performance.”); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 415 (1989) (“ The existence of such right of control,
and not the extent of its exercise, gives rise to the employer-employee relationship.”).
38. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 324 (“Since the common-law
test contains ‘no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find
the answer, . . . all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and
weighed with no one factor being decisive.’” (citing NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of
Am., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968))).
39. Pinsof, supra note 9, at 347; see also Muhl, supra note 31, at 7, exhibit
7 (2002). There are many versions of the common law Control Test: The IRS has
adopted a twenty-factor “Right to Control” test that includes additional factors
beyond those in common law. Many state courts have developed their own versions of the common law test with other added factors. For more information on
common law test variations, see Pinsof, supra note 9, at 347 n.3.
40. Carlson, supra note 20, at 339 (emphasis added); see Quintanilla v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1017 (T.C. 2016) (“An independent contractor is one who works for another but according to his own manner
and method, free from direction or right of direction in matters relating to performance of work save as to results.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY,
§ 220 cmt. e (1958); MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 13, at 1
(2016) (“An independent contractor provides a good or service to another individual or business, often under the terms of a contract that dictates the work
outcome, but the contractor retains control over how they provide the good or
service. The independent contractor is not subject to the employer ’s control or
guidance except as designated in a mutually binding agreement. The contract
for a specific job usually describes its expected outcome.”).
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The control test applies to several federal statutes, including
(but not limited to): the Employee Retirement Security Act
(ERISA), 41 which “establishes minimum standards for retirement, health, and other welfare benefit plans, including life insurance [and] disability insurance” for employees; 42 the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which affords employees a right to
unionize and permits collective bargaining;43 and the Federal
Unemployment Tax Law (FUTA) and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), which govern employer and employee tax obligations for unemployment insurance, social security, and Medicare benefits. 44 These statutes rely on this test to determine
when a worker is deemed an employee and thus is entitled to
certain benefits from their employer.
2. Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test was created as an alternative to
the common law control test. Courts utilize this test when Congress clearly intended the statute in question to be applied more
broadly than the control test permits. 45 Although both this test
and the control test consider the employer’s control over its employees, the economic realities test is focused less on the “tech-

41. Or some version of the control test, as described above. See discussion
supra note 39; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323 (noting the
circular nature of ERISA’s definition of “employee” and thus “adopt[ing] a common-law [control] test for determining who qualifies as an ‘employee’ under
ERISA”).
42. ERISA Plan, TOTAL ADMIN. SERV. CORP. (2016), https://www.tasconline
.com/biz-resource-center/plans/erisa-plan; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
503 U.S. at 323 (interpreting the definition of employee under ERISA).
43. Rights We Protect: Employee Rights, NAT. LAB. REL. BD., https://www
.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employee-rights (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
44. Federal Unemployment Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs
.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/federal-unemployment-tax (last visited Nov. 30, 2017); Employers’ Responsibility for FICA Payroll Taxes, BIZFILINGS, https://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/research-topics/managing-your-taxes/
payroll-taxes/employers-responsibility-for-fica-payroll-taxes (last visited Nov.
30, 2017).
45. See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“ The Supreme Court has observed, however, that the ‘striking
breadth’ of the FLSA’s definition of ‘employ’ ‘stretches the meaning of “employee” to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles . . . .’”); United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945) (“ The use of the words ‘each’ and ‘any’ to
modify ‘employee,’ which in turn is defined to include ‘any’ employed individual,
leaves no doubt as to the Congressional intention to include all employees
within the scope of the Act unless specifically excluded.”).
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nical concepts” than on the “economic realities” of the relationship, as the name suggests. 46 The focal point of the analysis is
“whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service . . . or is, as a matter of economic
fact, in business for himself.” 47 The factors of this test, which
should be weighed equally, 48 include: “(1) the degree of control
exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the worker’s
opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker’s investment in the
business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; (5) the
degree of skill required to perform the work; and (6) the extent
to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s
business.” 49
Courts have applied the economic realities test to a number
of federal statutes, including (but not limited to): the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), which sets minimum wage and overtime
pay requirements for employees;50 the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA), which provides certain protections for eligible employees in the event of necessary health or family leave; 51 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prevents employers
46. See Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA should be grounded in ‘economic reality rather than technical
concepts.’” (quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop. Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33
(1961))).
47. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotations omitted); see David Weil, Administrator ’s Interpretation
No. 2015-1, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (July 15, 2015), http://www.blr.com/html_email/
AI2015-1.pdf; MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 13, at 3 (“An employee who only invests time in one enterprise and who sells his or her services
to only one ‘customer,’ the employer, is economically dependent upon that work.
An independent contractor is in business for him or herself, invests in his or her
own equipment and supplies, and has a broad customer base.”).
48. See Weil, supra note 47 (“ The factors should not be analyzed mechanically or in a vacuum, and no single factor, including control, should be overemphasized. Instead, each factor should be considered in light of the ultimate
determination of whether the worker is really in business for him or herself (and
thus is an independent contractor) or is economically dependent on the employer (and thus is its employee).”).
49. Flint Eng’g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d at 1440 (citing Brock v. Superior
Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1058–59 (2d Cir. 1988)); Muhl, supra note 31, at 8
exhibit 3.
50. Coverage Under the FLSA, FLSA, http://www.flsa.com/coverage.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2017); see, e.g., Sec’y of Lab. v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529,
1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (using the economic realities test to interpret employee in
the context of the FLSA).
51. FMLA (Family & Medical Leave), U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol
.gov/general/topic/benefits-leave/fmla (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (including up
to twelve weeks of unpaid protected leave).
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from discriminating in hiring, firing, and paying of employees on
the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.” 52
These statutes use this broadly written test to determine when
a worker is owed these fundamental protections.
B. THE RISE OF THE GIG ECONOMY AND THE INDEPENDENT
WORKFORCE
Courts developed employee classification tests during an era
when the employer-employee relationship was the most prevalent work arrangement.53 Although independent contractors existed, they were far from legislative focus and, consequently, contractors received little legal attention. Thus statutory benefits
and protections were only established for employees, who were
considered the center of the workforce, and did not apply to the
much smaller subset of independent contractors. 54 Nevertheless,
in the last decade independent work has grown significantly
more popular, leaving an increasing share of the workforce without the legal protections that were intended to cover them. 55
The gig economy is the label given to describe this recent
increase in supply and demand for independent work arrangements. 56 Companies have embraced gig work and are able to facilitate these job opportunities based on a very lean business
52. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORCOMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm (last visited
Nov. 30, 2017).
53. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 25, at 663. (“Most labor and employment
laws assume a paradigmatic relationship between an ‘employer ’ and ‘employee.’
The employer in this model contracts directly with an individual employee to
perform an indefinite series or duration of tasks, subject to the employer ’s actual or potential supervision over the employee’s method, manner, time and
place of performance. This model describes most workers well enough, but there
has always been a large pool of workers in alternative relationships with recipients of services.”).
54. See id. (stating that there is valid concern that many alternative workers are not included in protective regulations).
55. See Joseph Shuford, Note, Hotel, Motel, Holiday Inn and Peer-to-Peer
Rentals: The Sharing Economy, North Carolina, and the Constitution, 16 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 301, 309–12 (2015), http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1295&context=ncjolt (comparing the extensive reach of
companies such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb).
56. See Nunberg, supra note 3. (“It’s been called the on-demand economy,
the 1099 economy, the peer-to-peer economy and freelance nation [among other
things including the sharing economy]. But over the past year, investors, the
business media and politicians seem to have settled on ‘the gig economy.’”).
Though there are small differences between each of these names, for purposes
of this Note, they will be treated as synonymous and the ideas generally encapTUNITY
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model wherein “companies fissure jobs into discrete tasks, or
‘gigs,’ to be performed by contracted workers on a temporary basis.” 57 Gig companies use technology to provide a mutually beneficial platform that connects workers and customers on demand: workers with a profitable service, skill, or good are
instantly connected with customers that are in need of such service, skill, or good. 58 These companies have developed in many
different forms. They are rideshare companies like Uber and
Lyft, 59 which allow drivers to use their own cars to offer taxi-like
rides to passengers; accommodation companies like Airbnb,
which permits people to monetize their homes by renting them
to travelers; delivery companies like Instacart, which provides
instant shopping and delivery of grocery-store goods; and entrepreneurial marketplaces like Etsy, which offers a worldwide
platform for designers, inventors, and other creators to showcase
their goods in their own virtual shop. 60 Gig workers are given
the opportunity to work independently, free from the typical restrictions of a nine-to-five desk job.61 These jobs are extremely
sulated in the term gig economy. For more information on some of the differences, see Megan Carboni, A New Class of Worker for the Sharing Economy,
22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2016).
57. Scott M. Prange, Managing the Workforce in the Gig Economy, HAW.
B.J., June 2016, at 4.
58. See Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is,
TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll; Elka
Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, BUREAU OF LAB. STATS.
(May 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/what-is-the-gig
-economy.htm.
59. See ROBERT HAHN & ROBERT METCALFE, BROOKINGS INST., THE
RIDESHARE REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC SURVEY AND SYNTHESIS (2017), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ridesharing-oup-1117-v6
-brookings1.pdf (describing and defining the growth of rideshare companies).
60. For a list of several prominent gig companies, including a description,
the date formed, and data on size, see Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 28–
33. Each company has a slogan that highlights the creative and efficient nature
of gig work. See generally About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/
about-us (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (“Airbnb is the easiest way for people to
monetize their extra space and showcase it to an audience of millions.”); Mission
& Values, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/mission (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (“Our
mission is to reimagine commerce in ways that build a more fulfilling and lasting world.”); INSTACART, http://careers.instacart.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2017)
(“[D]eliver[ing] the future of food to millions of customers.”); Lyft Launches 50+
Cities in Biggest Expansion Yet, LYFT BLOG, https://blog.lyft.com/posts/lyft
-launches-biggest-expansion-yet (Feb. 23, 2017) (“[I]mprov[ing] lives by creating
the first peer-to-peer ridesharing community.”); UBER, https://www.uber.com/
our-story (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) (“Finding the way: Creating possibilities
for riders, drivers, and cities.”).
61. See supra text accompanying note 3; Kasriel supra note 1 (“[M]any of
today’s workers are swapping long commutes, outdated workplace hierarchies,
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versatile and can be a lucrative alternative for different people
for different reasons. 62 Sometimes these jobs fill in gaps between
full-time employment, but more often than not they offer a different way of life that has been embraced by modern society.63
While an independent workforce has always existed in some
form (independent contractors, freelancers, and the self-employed), these arrangements multiplied as traditional employment disappeared during the economic crisis of 2008. 64 Even as
economic conditions improve, companies still rely on independent workers, and workers continue to embrace their newfound
independence. As of 2015, more than forty percent of adult workers in the United States have performed gig work.65 This number
is expected to surpass fifty percent by 2020. 66 Not only is gig
work prevalent, it is also profitable. In 2013, the industry generated fifteen billion dollars and is predicted to increase by an

and the nine-to-five grind for the freedom to be their own boss and set their own
hours . . . .”).
62. See supra pp. 887–88 (providing examples, including Uber and Lyft
drivers, Airbnb hosts, Instacart shoppers, and Etsy shop owners); Zeninjor Enwemeka, What the Booming Gig Economy Means for the Future of Work, WBUR:
BOSTONOMIX (Nov. 2, 2017), http://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2017/11/02/gig
-economy (interviewing Aaron Ennis, “a super gig guy,” who prefers performing
gig work than to having a full-time job and who has made six figures doing so,
almost three times the amount he made running a computer center).
63. Nunberg, supra note 3; see Diane Mulcahy, Reasons To Embrace the Gig
Economy, Not Fear It, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kauffman/2016/11/10/reasons-to-embrace-the-gig-economy-not-fear-it
(“Like
any change, it will be welcome for some and painful for others, but mostly what
the gig economy does is give us the chance to take our lives—both professional
and personal—away from employers and back into our own hands. That’s a
change worth embracing.”).
64. See TERESA CARROLL, KELLY SERVICES INC., AGENTS OF CHANGE: INDEPENDENT WORKERS ARE RESHAPING THE WORKFORCE 6–8 (2015); MCKINSEY
GLOB. INST., HELP WANTED: THE FUTURE OF WORK IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES
1 (2012). Today’s well-known gig companies were born during this time: Uber
was created in 2008; Lyft was created in 2012; Airbnb was created in 2008; Etsy
was created in 2005.
65. See Prange, supra note 57 (“According to a nascent poll by TIME . . . .
these practices by companies have become so widespread that 44% of United
States adults, or roughly 90 million workers, have at some time performed
gigs.”).
66. See Scott G. Grubin, The Legal Lowdown On Employee Classification:
An Interview with Employment Lawyer Scott Grubin of Wigdor LLP, WIGDOR
LLP EMP. LIT. DIGEST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.wigdorlaw.com/employee
-classification-interview-scott-grubin; see also Enwemeka, supra note 62
(“[B]etween 2005 and 2015 over 90 percent of net employment growth in the
U.S. was in the gig economy.”).
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astounding 2200% to $335 billion by 2025. 67 Gig work is “remaking our industries, economy, and society[,] just as steam, electricity, and internal combustion did before them.” 68 Scholars proclaim that the rise of the gig economy is the “industrial
revolution of our times” 69 and are confident it is here to stay. 70
C. HOW THE MODERN WORKFORCE INTERACTS WITH EXISTING
EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION TESTS
Although independent work has only recently become more
popular,71 issues around correctly classifying independent workers are not new. 72 Worker misclassification lawsuits have been
disputed in courts for over 100 years. 73 In 1914, a coal company
argued before Judge Learned Hand that it was “not in the business of coal mining” and therefore did not employ miners, nor
owe them employment benefits. 74 Instead, the company claimed
the miners were independent contractors who utilized the company’s property and sold the company the coal they collected. 75
Judge Hand held that the workers were in fact employees, “stating it would be ‘absurd to class[ify] such a miner as an independent contractor’ given that miners alone ‘carr[y] on the company’s

67. Shuford, supra note 55, at 310 (“PricewaterhouseCoopers, a company
that does financial consulting among other things, found that the sharing economy generated $15 billion in 2013, and projects that annual revenue will increase to $335 billion in 2025, a staggering 2,200 percent increase in 12 years.”).
68. Erik Brynjolfsson, Open Letter on the Digital Economy, MIT TECH. REV.
(June 4, 2015) https://www.technologyreview.com/5/538091/open-letter-on-the
-digital-economy.
69. Nunberg, supra note 3.
70. See Mulcahy, supra note 63 (“ The gig economy is here to stay, is growing, and is fundamentally changing the way we work.”); LIBBY REDER, ASPEN
INST., DATA ON THE SHARING & ON-DEMAND ECONOMY: WHAT WE KNOW AND
DON’T KNOW 7 (2016) (“ The quick pace of business growth in the sharing/ondemand economy coupled with the dramatic growth of this area of the labor
market suggest that both consumers and workers value these platforms, and
they are likely here to stay.”).
71. See Shuford, supra note 55, at 301–02.
72. See Pinsof, supra note 9, at 342–43 (“While employment classification
is an old legal conundrum, the rise of the ‘gig-economy’ is now pushing America’s
broken system to the forefront of policymakers’ and courts’ agendas with new
force.”).
73. Id. (“For over 100 years, America has classified workers into these two
categories, yet the law continuously fails to do so in a uniform, predictable, and
purposeful way.”).
74. Id. (citing Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d Cir.
1914)).
75. Id.
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only business.’” 76 Today, gig companies have caused fundamental changes in traditional business structures and substantive
work, creating new challenges not so easily resolved in court.77
Worker misclassification lawsuits have been filed against
almost all major gig companies. 78 Plaintiff workers seek relief
for lost benefits and protections due to misclassification as independent workers.79 Defendant companies hope to prevent or
swiftly resolve these costly disputes. However, most suits end in
a sizable settlement agreement, which leaves worker-classification issues unresolved and companies financially damaged. 80 For
example, in 2014, Uber drivers in California and Massachusetts
filed class-action lawsuits against Uber seeking reimbursement
for business expenses.81 The drivers claimed they were incorrectly classified as independent contractors under California labor law, 82 and consequently were owed compensation for certain
expenses. 83 The parties decided to settle this suit for $100 million in April 2016.84 This resolution has been touted as “historic”
and “one of the largest ever [settlements] achieved on behalf of

76. Id.
77. See DAVID WEIL, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., ADMR ’S INTERPRETATION NO.
2015-1 (2015) (“Misclassification of employees as independent contractors is
found in an increasing number of workplaces in the United States, in part reflecting larger restructuring of business organizations.”); see also MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 13, at 3 (describing the “seven factors the
[Supreme] Court has considered significant” in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors).
78. Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 584–85 tbl.1 (2016).
79. See Kessler, supra note 15.
80. Id.
81. Second Amended Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 2, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 133826-EMC) (“Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of Uber drivers who have
been misclassified as independent contractors and thereby required to pay business expenses (such as for their vehicles, gas, and maintenance).”).
82. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (“For the purpose of determining
whether an employer can rebut a prima facie showing of employment, the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Borello ‘enumerated a number of indicia of an
employment relationship.’”).
83. Id.
84. Hannah Levintova, Uber Agrees to Pay $100 Million to Drivers in Historic Class Action Settlement, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www
.motherjones.com/politics/2016/uber-announces-it-will-pay100-million-drivers
-historic-class-action-settlement. This ongoing settlement has not yet been approved by the court.
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workers who alleged that they were improperly classified as independent contractors.” 85 However historic, this settlement, and
all those like it, has little legal significance except to further underscore the law’s continuing inability to properly classify workers. As the next Part of this Note demonstrates, the gig economy
poses a unique set of challenges that make it especially difficult
to properly classify workers with existing tests. This results in
denied workers’ rights and dangerous limits on economic growth.
It is therefore imperative that an immediate resolution is implemented to protect workers and the gig economy the damaging
effects of outdated employment laws.
II. EXISTING EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION TESTS DO
NOT ADEQUATELY EMBRACE GIG ECONOMY WORKERS
AND CREATE DANGEROUS OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC
GROWTH
Although many of the concerns about the employer-employee relationship that necessitated the development of employment laws during the Industrial Revolution are still present today, certain principles that underlie these laws have become illsuited to properly regulate the modern economy. This Part analyzes the failure of employment law to adequately protect the gig
economy’s independent workforce and the dangerous limits it
places on economic growth. Section A discusses the challenge of
accurately analyzing the control and independence factors in existing employee classification tests as they apply to gig workers,
using the recent Uber lawsuit as an example. Section B explores
the underlying fundamental tension between existing employee
classification tests and the gig economy. This Section also assesses how the existing legal regime ultimately harms both
workers and companies in the gig economy. This Part demonstrates the necessity of updating existing employment laws to
preserve the gig economy.
A. GIG WORKERS: AN AMBIGUOUS CLASSIFICATION
The decision whether to classify gig workers as employees
or independent contractors has perplexed state, federal, and foreign courts.86 In many ways, gig workers appear similar to independent contractors because they have significant flexibility
85. Id.
86. See Cherry, supra note 78, at 579–94 (discussing lawsuits addressing
this classification issue and noting that “[w]hile many lawsuits have been filed,
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over the time, place, and manner of their work.87 However, gig
companies still retain a measure of control and power over their
workers that is reminiscent of traditional employment.88 This
business model has left the gig economy conflicted over what the
proper classification should be.
Gig companies often declare their workers to be independent
contractors due to their high level of flexibility and autonomy
over their work, while gig workers, desiring the rights and benefits of employment, seek to be classified as employees. In asserting their respective positions, both sides of the debate rely on the
central factors in existing classification tests: control and independence.89 An employer has significant control over its employees and these employees are dependent on the employer, while a
company has little control over its independent contractors and
these contractors are, as the name suggests, fundamentally independent from the company.
Gig workers do not neatly align with either of the available
classifications. Gig work is characterized by its independence,
offering the flexibility to accept or decline work at one’s leisure,
in one’s own location, and by one’s own method. 90 On the other
hand, gig companies often implement policies and requirements
that seek to limit the freedom of workers to set their own terms
of service and control their professional behavior. 91 Yet the relationship between gig workers and gig companies does generally
remain temporary and detached, and as such, does not seem to
justify burdening the company with the responsibility of full employee status.92 Thus gig work is forced into a legal gray area
that tends to provoke conflict. 93
The controversy in classifying gig workers has been most
prominently debated in the context of the recent Uber misclassification class-action lawsuit, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies,
there have been no definitive resolutions, binding precedent, or guidance.”); Sarah O’Connor et al., Uber Drivers Win UK Legal Battle for Worker s’ Rights, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/a0bb02b2-9d0a
-11e6-a6e4-8b8e77dd083a.
87. See Cherry, supra note 78, at 582.
88. See id. (“Control may be high given that companies like Uber use customer ratings to maintain almost a constant surveillance over workers, with
consumers deputized to manage the workforce.”).
89. See supra Part I.A.
90. See Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 9.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 8–9.
93. Id.
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Inc.94 Uber drivers contended that they were employees because
of the control exerted over them by Uber. 95 They cited Uber’s
detailed requirements which include “rules regarding their conduct with customers, the cleanliness of their vehicles, their timeliness in picking up customers and taking them to their destination, what they are allowed to say to customers, etc.” 96 Drivers
claimed that the failure to abide by these requirements made
them subject to termination. 97 Additionally, the drivers argued
they are not independent from Uber because they were economically dependent on Uber for business and Uber was equally dependent on drivers as the integral function of its business. 98
In contrast, Uber defended its classification of drivers as independent contractors by reasoning that Uber is not an employer
of drivers but simply provides a platform that facilitates an independent business arrangement between driver and customer. 99 Consequently, Uber denied having meaningful control
over drivers’ time, place, and manner of work. 100 The overarch-

94. In 2014, Uber drivers brought a lawsuit against Uber for misclassifying
them as independent contractors. See supra text accompanying notes 81–83;
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
95. Second Amended Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand at 5, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (No. 13-3826-EMC) (“[Drivers] are required to follow
a litany of detailed requirements imposed on them by Uber and they are graded,
and are subject to termination, based on their failure to adhere to these requirements.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Compare id. (“ The drivers’ services are fully integrated into Uber ’s
business, and without the drivers, Uber ’s business would not exist.”), and Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Uber Techs., Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1133 (No. 13-3826-EMC) (“Uber ’s system
relies on drivers to function because, without drivers, there would be no one to
pick up passengers, and no way for Uber to derive revenue by taking a percentage of the fare.”), with Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552 (2d
Cir. 1914), and supra discussion Part I.C.
99. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141 (“Uber passes itself off as merely a
technological intermediary between potential riders and potential drivers.”);
Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, Taskrabbit, and Co.: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y
J. 619, 619 (2016).
100. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., UBERLITIGATION.COM, http://www
.uberlitigation.com/faq.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter UBERLITIGATION.COM] (“Uber ’s position is that it never sets drivers’ schedules, never requires them to log into the Uber App for any minimum amount of time, never
requires them to accept any particular trip request received via the Uber App,
never assigns them a geographic territory, never restricts them from engaging
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ing point of Uber’s argument was that Uber is a software company, not a rideshare company. 101 It does not rent office space
for its drivers, own any cars, or offer any of the driver training
typical of transportation companies.102 Instead, its entire infrastructure is a mobile-phone application. Drivers freely contract
to utilize this technology.103 Thus, Uber contended, drivers were
independent from Uber, and Uber exercised little control over
their actions.104
From a legal standpoint, both Uber and its drivers make
plausible arguments for the proper classification. 105 Uber drivers exhibit characteristics of both employees and independent
contractors. In some ways, Uber drivers are independent and autonomous.106 In other ways, they depend on and are controlled
by Uber. 107 Like independent contractors, drivers have control
over their work.108 They are free to set their working hours and
location.109 They accept trips according to their own method and
provide rides in their own manner, in addition to providing their
own car to give rides.110 They are not subject to direct supervision from Uber. 111 They are not economically dependent on Uber,
as they can hold other jobs and perform services for other companies, including rideshare competitors. 112 They can also accept
in another occupation or business, and never restricts them from simultaneous
use of other apps like Lyft and Sidecar.”).
101. Prassl & Risak, supra note 99, at 637 (noting that in the United States,
“the terms and conditions a customer must accept in order to download the required software (‘app’) . . . inform[s] customers in capital letters that they [must]
‘ACKNOWLEDGE THAT UBER DOES NOT PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION
OR LOGISTICS SERVICES OR FUNCTION AS A TRANSPORTATION CARRIER.’”).
102. Kessler, supra note 15 (“Gig economy companies do not own cars, hotels,
or even their workers’ cleaning supplies. What they own is a marketplace with
two sides. On one side are people who need a job done—a ride to the airport, a
clean house, a lunchtime delivery. On the other are people who are willing to do
that job.”).
103. UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive (“Drive when you want, earn what
you need.”).
104. See UBERLITIGATION.COM, supra note 100.
105. See Carlson, supra note 20, at 338–53.
106. See Cherry, supra note 78, at 582.
107. Id. at 583.
108. How to Use the Uber Driver App, UBER, http://www.uber.com/drive/
resources/how-to-use-the-driver-app (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Scott Van Maldegiam, How to Drive for Uber and Lyft at the Same
Time, RIDESHARE GUY BLOG & PODCAST, (July 28, 2016), https://www
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or reject rides, permitting them to control their opportunity for
profit or loss. 113
However, in many ways Uber exerts employer-like control
over drivers. Drivers are given a guidebook that offers advice on
the manner and method of optimal service. Drivers are also supervised in part by the use of the Uber app, which monitors their
driving activity and permits riders to give feedback. 114 This customer feedback can lead to termination if it becomes cumulatively negative. 115 Drivers are also required to accept a certain
number of rides per month or will be disconnected from the app,
permitting Uber to have further control over drivers’ activity. 116
The only thing that is clear in this controversy is that the
proper classification is ambiguous. Uber retains some control
and power over its drivers, yet drivers benefit from a significant
amount of flexibility and autonomy. This relationship falls
within an uncontemplated space somewhere between employment and an independent-contractor relationship. This analysis
parallels classification conflicts in most other gig companies—
“highlight[ing] the outdated nature of workers’ laws.” 117
Ultimately, it appears Uber and its drivers are likely to
reach a settlement agreement in the O’Connor matter, or proceed to individual arbitration. 118 Either result prevents an op.therideshareguy.com/how-to-drive-for-uber-and-lyft-at-the-same-time (explaining that many rideshare drivers utilize both companies and instructing
listeners how to do so efficiently).
113. See Catherine Tucciarello, The Square Peg Between Two Round Holes:
Why California’s Traditional Right to Control Test Is Not Relevant for On-Demand Workers, 13 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 351, 359–60 (2017); see also O’Connor
v. Uber Techs. Inc., 82. F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“ The ‘most
significant consideration’ is the putative employer ’s ‘right to control work details.’”).
114. Tucciarello, supra note 113, at 366.
115. Id.
116. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149 (“Uber considers ‘[r]ejecting too
many trips’ to be a performance issue that could lead to possible termination
from the Uber platform.”).
117. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Uber Case Highlights Outdated Worker Protection Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/
16/business/dealbook/uber-case-highlights-outdated-worker-protection-laws
.html (“ This case truly highlights the outdated nature of workers’ laws in America . . . .”).
118. Uber and its drivers reached a proposed settlement agreement in 2016,
but the court declined to approve the settlement. The case is now stayed pending
several appeals regarding the enforcement of the arbitration clause. Due to a
ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it appears this case may be forced
to proceed to individual arbitration. See Paresh Dave, In Stinging Decision for
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portunity for the court’s consideration on the proper classification of Uber drivers. Despite there being no expectation for a final conclusion as to worker classification, the court has importantly recognized the ambiguities in classifying rideshare
drivers. The court acknowledged “there were sufficient allegations . . . to make the existence of an employment relationship
plausible . . . [but also] a number of factors [that] weigh against
finding an employment relationship.” 119 The court noted that
“numerous factors point[ed] in opposing directions,” 120 reasoning
that “many of [these] factors . . . appear outmoded in this context” because “Uber’s business model creates significant challenges” to the “application of the traditional test of employment”
which “evolved under an economic model very different from the
new ‘[gig] economy.’” 121 This court correctly identified the heart
of the issue in classifying drivers and other gig workers: there is
an underlying conflict between the modern gig economy and outdated employment laws.
B. A FUNDAMENTAL TENSION BETWEEN EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
THE GIG ECONOMY
The reason that gig workers are not easily classified as employees or independent contractors is due to a fundamental tension between the conventional notion of employment and gig
work. In drafting employment laws, twentieth-century legislators seemed to rely on an incorrect belief that business and individual interests are entirely at odds.122 Thus legislators at the
Uber Drivers, Appeals Court Says They Must Go to Arbitration, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-uber
-lawsuit-20160907-snap-story.html. For more details on this ongoing case, see
http://www.uberlawsuit.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). For more details on the
proposed settlement agreement, see Harry Campbell, Breaking News: Uber Settles Employee Misclassification Lawsuit in California, RIDESHARE GUY BLOG &
PODCAST (Apr. 21, 2016), https://therideshareguy.com/breaking-news-uber
-settles-employee-misclassification-lawsuit-in-california.
119. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 6354534,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2013).
120. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
121. Id.
122. See Prange, supra note 57, at 7–8; supra Part I.B; see also Miriam A.
Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair Labor
Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1077, 1077–78 (2009) (“When Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938 to help relieve the
downward spiral of wages in the Great Depression, America’s workers commonly showed up to an employer ’s place of business, leaving little doubt if they
were ‘working’ and thus entitled to the statute’s minimum wage. Times, and
technologies, have changed. With modern computers, individuals often perform
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time could not have conceived of a mutually beneficial business
model that successfully operates on minimal operating costs, a
remote technological marketplace, and international demand.
Nor could they have anticipated that a workforce might value
autonomous, short-term, flexible work over lifetime job security.
Thus existing employment laws cannot possibly be expected to
effectively apply to, let alone support, this type of economy.
Even modern scholars often fail to understand the gig economy’s business model and criticize it as an example of abusive,
greedy businesses taking advantage of vulnerable, victimized
employees. 123 However, the controversy is not nearly this simple.
This business model is intended to be mutually beneficial.124 Gig
companies use technology to create a marketplace that connects
individuals in need of work with individuals in need of services.125 It is true that businesses benefit financially from the
independent contractor classification, but this also benefits
workers by creating job opportunities. By employing a lean business model, gig companies can operate efficiently and pass on
savings to customers—simultaneously increasing demand for
their services and generating a need for workers to fill this demand, to the benefit of workers. Gig workers desire these job opportunities for the ability to set their own schedules, govern their
own work methods, and freely choose and reject projects from
work on someone else’s behalf while sitting at home, using not their employer ’s
factory machinery, but rather a computer they purchased for themselves, as
well as their own Internet connection. The work is often engaging and is far
more pleasant than operating a drill press of the 1930s. In ways, some of this
online ‘labor ’ can even feel creative, or be part of a game or a competition.”).
123. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
85, 91 (2015) (“Uber has faced criticism along at least six dimensions.”); Douglas
Holtz-Eakin et al., Washington Should Harness the Power of the Gig Economy,
HILL (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy
-budget/313512-washington-should-harness-the-power-of-the-gig-economy
(“Policymakers often assume that the rapid growth in the gig economy is leaving
workers vulnerable, and they have sought to constrain the independent nature
of these jobs.”).
124. See Kessler, supra note 15 (“But it’s safe to say that there are advantages to being an employee (security, safety laws, minimum wage, benefits)
and that there are also advantages to being an independent contractor (freedom,
independence). Similarly, there are advantages to hiring employees (quality
control, dependable workers) and hiring contract workers (cheaper, don’t need
to guarantee work).”).
125. See Rogers, supra note 123, at 86–87 (“Uber ’s business model is actually quite simple: its smartphone-based app connects drivers offering rides and
passengers seeking them, passengers pay mileage-based fees through credit
cards that the company keeps on file, and Uber then takes a percentage of each
fare and gives the rest to drivers.”); supra Part I.B.
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one or many companies. 126 The gig business model allows individuals to work free from “structures of the traditional employment relationship.” 127 More importantly, it creates an opportunity for individuals to avoid unemployment and poverty by
providing a necessary work alternative to disappearing manufacturing and other industrial-era jobs.128 The gig economy is financially lucrative for both the individual and the workforce as
a whole, and harnesses innovation and creativity to deliver better, faster, cheaper services to customers.
As the gig business model benefits both gig companies and
workers in theory, criticism is more properly directed at the laws
that regulate these relationships. Existing employment laws
force an unsuitable choice between classifying a worker as an
employee or independent contractor, a binary choice that results
in workers receiving all of the benefits and protections of employment laws or none of them. 129 Additionally, the employee classification places an extreme financial burden on emerging companies to provide benefits to workers, while the independent
contractor classification lets companies avoid responsibility for
workers altogether. These classifications effectively harm both
126. Michelle M. Lasswell, Note, Workers’ Compensation: Determining the
Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor, 43 DRAKE L.
REV. 419, 422 (1994) (“From the worker ’s viewpoint, being classified as an independent contractor also has advantages. An independent contractor is an entrepreneur who can take on several specialized projects. The independent contractor has the freedom to choose the method for accomplishing the job and is free
from the structures of the traditional employment relationship. The independent contractor can also deduct expenses that employees cannot, such as meals
and entertainment, and taxes are not withheld from the wages.”).
127. Id.
128. Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 123 (“[E]vidence indicates that the gig
economy may be countercyclical in nature, and its rapid growth in the years
following the Great Recession provided already struggling workers a flexible
way to earn additional income where traditional payroll jobs failed. . . . The gut
instinct that gig economy workers are vulnerable is correct, but for the wrong
reasons. Gig economy workers are vulnerable because traditional payroll jobs
failed to deliver sufficient job growth and pay increases during the recession.
Without the gig economy, these struggles very well could have been a lot
worse.”).
129. Full protections and benefits are given to workers classified as employees, whereas these are not given to independent contractors. This begs the question why there is not a more feasible middle ground that would target middleground workers like gig workers. See infra Part III.B.2 for a proposed answer
to this question. See also Enwemeka, supra note 62 (“‘[I]f you look at our labor
market, it’s very clear that it’s set up to essentially penalize anybody that
doesn’t have a full-time job . . . .’ [S]o . . . what’s really needed is a good hard
look at the entire structure of our labor market.” (quoting Dane Mulcahy)).
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gig workers and gig companies by forcing a choice between protecting workers and promoting economic growth.
If classified as an independent contractor, workers have limited access to fair wages, overtime compensation, unemployment
insurance, social security benefits, disability insurance, health
insurance, workers compensation, retirement savings plans, and
many other benefits that employees are entitled to. 130 The growing popularity of nontraditional employment relationships has
revealed the inherent unfairness in the independent contractor
classification. As an important part of the modern workforce, gig
workers are indeed owed at least some of the rights and protections of traditional employment, and gig companies ought to be
held responsible for providing these rights. Without these rights,
workers have no financial security or social safety net to fall back
on. 131 However, because the outdated laws that govern employee
classification force a rigid choice between the two classifications,
gig companies do, more often than not, choose the independent
contractor classification, as it creates embedded cost savings
which are crucial to their lean business model. In some ways,
these savings can be deemed unjustifiable, as they are the result
of avoiding many responsibilities for their workers’ rights and
benefits.132 This choice is merely the lesser of two evils for these
companies. Gig companies are exposed to the risk of costly and
damaging class-action litigation in choosing the independent
contractor classification. 133 They are also limited from imple-

130. Pinsof, supra note 9, at 353.
131. Id.
132. Davey Alba, Instacart Shoppers Can Now Choose to be Real Employees,
WIRED (June 22, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/06/instacart-shoppers-can
-now-choose-real-employees (“According to calculations by the National Employment Law Project, businesses stand to save up to 30 percent of their payroll
tax costs by choosing to classify workers as independent contractors.”); Kessler,
supra note 15 (“Not being responsible for employees’ taxes and benefits allows
companies like Handy to operate with 20% to 30% less in labor costs than the
incumbent competition, leading to eye-popping numbers like Uber ’s $40 billion
valuation . . . .”).
133. SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FLEXIBLE STAFFING SOLUTIONS § 9 (Aug. 1999), http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/herman/reports/
futurework/conference/staffing/9_standards.htm (“In the absence of clear legal
language, employee coverage and employer liability is being determined by the
courts, which often apply different standards to different laws and sometimes
even different standards to the same law. Such ambiguity causes considerable
confusion and legal expense for businesses.”); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees, Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 98 (2013) (“ The ‘uncertainty can become a
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menting efficient and protective employee and workplace policies for fear of crossing into employer-like territory. 134 The uncertainty of the correct classification for their workers forces
companies to operate in a legal gray area that has financial and
reputational consequences for the companies, even if they are
acting reasonably in the best interests of their business. 135
The only present alternative—classifying workers as employees—is equally problematic. Though this classification
would provide workers with the legal benefits and protections
intended to cover them, it creates significant issues for gig companies. Forcing employer status on fledgling gig companies
threatens their financial stability, as employee-based social programs are extremely costly. 136 These companies are built so as
to require minimal operating expenses, and the costs of providing the full range of employee benefits to workers would capsize
this lean business model. 137 This added expense would make it
breeding ground for litigation.’”); Noam Scheiber, A Middle Ground Between
Contract Worker and Employee, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015) https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/business/a-middle-ground-between-contract-workerand-employee.html (“Many start-ups can’t withstand a lawsuit even if a company is in the right.”).
134. Kessler, supra note 15 (“ They are going to have a choice between taking
actions that make them more marketable, and thus becoming vulnerable as employers under these laws, and remaining completely hands off.”); Scheiber, supra note 133 (“Under an employment model, by contrast, the company has a
much more reliable and knowledgeable work force, one that can be held to a
specific standard of quality and a more consistent schedule.”).
135. See Leslie Hook, Uber and Airbnb’s Business Models Come Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/381e27ee-c685
-11e6-8f29-9445cac8966f (“[O]ver the past 12 months, these two icons . . . have
clashed again and again with courts and lawmakers, and found their businesses
constrained by increasing regulation.”).
136. Julie Verhage, An Expert in Valuation Says Uber Is Only Worth $27
Billion, Not $62.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-17/an-expert-in-valuation-says-uber
-may-have-already-peaked (claiming Uber ’s financial worth is threatened by
the risk of operating getting more expensive as this would necessarily reduce
its business valuation and deter investors); Douglas MacMillan et al., Uber
Drivers Settle with Ride-Hailing Company in Labor Dispute, WALL ST. J. (April
21, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-drivers-settle-with-ride-hailing
-company-in-labor-dispute-1461292153 (“Concerns over the status of gig workers have caused tech investors and entrepreneurs to become more cautious
about on-demand businesses. Some startups . . . have been unable to secure new
funding and were forced to shut down . . . .”).
137. Hook, supra note 135 (“In the US, many so-called sharing economy companies that rely on independent contractors could see their business models upended if courts determine that their workers should be treated as employees.”);
Kessler, supra note 15 (“If we continue to not see reform, then it will probably
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likely that these companies are unable to provide the benefits
they are known for: flexibility for workers and affordability for
customers. For workers, employee status would revoke many of
the most positive qualities of gig work: it would limit the flexibility, freedom, and control available to independent contractors,
as employers are granted a significant amount of control and supervision over their employees.138 These added costs would also
increase the low prices most valued by customers and in turn
reduce demand and need for gig workers. Many scholars warn
that employer status could financially destroy many gig companies and predict that the gig economy may cease to exist altogether under this classification. 139
This seemingly unsolvable controversy is a result of the ideological dichotomy that founded existing employment laws. Employment laws heavily regulate businesses in order to protect
traditional worker rights and benefits, but this is accomplished
at the cost of economic prosperity. Because these laws are based
on principles that pit businesses against individuals, they make
it impossible to guarantee both worker rights and promote economic growth. This is demonstrated by employment law’s binary
employee-classification system. 140 The rigid structure of this system creates an unnecessary choice between classifying workers
as independent contractors, which facilitates efficient business
and spurs economic growth but fails to fully protect workers, and
classifying workers as employees, which protects worker rights
and benefits but limits economic growth. Thus the classifications
require a choice that either eliminates necessary protections for
cut out a lot of services and opportunities, because not everybody can put people
on full-time or part-time paid benefits. It just wouldn’t make sense.”).
138. Employers may supervise their employees more than independent contractors and must do so for purposes of collecting certain required information
for applying employee benefits. It is relevant to note that the collection of this
information creates practical difficulties in quantifying this information. See
Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 13 (“ The boundary between work and nonwork for independent workers is largely indeterminable.”).
139. JAMES SHERK, HERITAGE FOUND., THE RISE OF THE “GIG” ECONOMY:
GOOD FOR WORKERS AND CONSUMERS 28 (Oct. 7, 2016); see Holtz-Eakin et al.,
supra note 123 (“[T]he shoot first, ask questions later attitude taken by local
policymakers could be a big mistake. It could end up hurting the very workers
that the policies are intended to help.”). Many of the arguments presented in
this paragraph are focused on gig companies in their beginning development
stages. Once these companies are off the ground they may become profitable
enough to afford at least some employee benefits. Uber has likely progressed to
this stage by now and thus is being used in this Note as an example because of
its notoriety, not because it is the gig company most at risk.
140. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
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gig workers or eliminates necessary gig jobs altogether. Neither
option is suitable for the gig economy.141 The gig economy misclassification issues have revealed that employment law’s existing dual-classification system no longer effectively governs the
employer-employee relationship.142
Worse than ineffectiveness, these limited classifications are
likely to regulate the gig economy to death. As the world modernizes and industrial jobs inevitably disappear, the gig economy
presents a vital opportunity to embrace change and stimulate
long-term economic prosperity. 143 Without this opportunity, the
future of the workforce is unclear. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the future of the workforce, businesses, and economy as
a whole to develop new laws that prevent the destruction of the
gig economy.
III. IMMEDIATE, COMPREHENSIVE, AND SUSTAINABLE
LEGAL REFORM IS NEEDED TO PRESERVE THE GIG
ECONOMY
A prosperous gig economy requires a modernized legal structure that promotes both economic growth and worker security.
Gig companies need legislative support that encourages entrepreneurial innovation, embraces changing business structures,
and fosters economic security. Gig workers need legislative action that stimulates the creation of new jobs, protects worker
rights, and equalizes access to employee benefits. The fundamental question is then: “[H]ow can we protect workers in this
new environment, while, at the same time, reaping the benefits

141. Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 8 (“Forcing these new forms of work
into a traditional employment relationship could be an existential threat to the
emergence of online-intermediated work, with adverse consequences for workers, consumers, businesses, and the economy.”).
142. Scheiber, supra note 133 (“[M]any workers in the so-called online gig
economy should have more rights and protections than most do now. At the
same time, . . . ‘forcing these new forms of work into a traditional employment
relationship could be an existential threat to the emergence of online-intermediated work.’”).
143. See Andrei Hagiu, Work 3.0: Redefining Jobs and Companies in the
Uber Age, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 29, 2015), http://
hbswk.hbs.edu/item/work-3-0-redefining-jobs-and-companies-in-the-uber-age
(“[W]hen many Americans remain underemployed and most workers feel time
crunched, the last thing we want to do is squander labor market opportunity
and flexibility.”).
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of change and innovation?” 144 This Part will suggest a comprehensive answer to this question. Section A will briefly review existing remedies and explain why they are insufficient. Section B
will propose a three-step reform proposal based on the most important components of a satisfactory resolution. This Part advocates for a remedy that provides both short- and long-term relief,
and fairly balances protections for the gig economy and its workers.
A. INSUFFICIENCY OF PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED REMEDIES
As illustrated above, 145 worker classification in the gig economy has produced a delicate legal conflict. Resolving this issue
requires immediate yet sustainable action. Although the federal
government has identified this as a central issue to be examined
in the near future, a specific solution has yet to be disclosed. 146
In the absence of official action, scholars have advanced many
possible theories on this topic. These theories range from a simple reinterpretation of existing employee classification tests, 147
to the creation of a third category of worker, 148 to resolution by
contract, 149 to simply maintaining the status quo. 150 However
144. Krueger, supra note 17, at 2; see Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 123 (“Instead of trying to limit independent work in favor of traditional work, policymakers should look for ways to harness the strengths of the gig economy so that
it can continue to provide a buffer for workers who fall on hard times.”); see also
Gapper, supra note 2 (“ The new world of work must chart a course between the
twin dangers of corporate conformism and worker exploitation.”); Hagiu, supra
note 143 (“We are on the cusp of a sea change in how we view employment. If
we manage this shift well, we’ll be creating an engine for economic growth. Mess
it up and we’ll stifle a major driver of innovation, business creation, and jobs.”).
145. See supra Part II.
146. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT
PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2017–2021 2, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep
-2017.pdf (“ The commission adds a new priority to address issues related to
complex employment relationships and structures in the 21st century workplace, focusing specifically on temporary workers, staffing agencies, independent contractor relationships, and the on-demand economy.”).
147. Carlson, supra note 20, 368; Maltby & Yamada, supra note 34, at 274;
Means & Seiner, supra note 19, at 1545–46; see Bodie, supra note 30; Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1674 (2016).
148. Tucciarello, supra note 113, at 369; Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at
27.
149. See Carboni, supra note 56, at 38–40 (noting that the FLSA’s understanding of a dependent contractor could be helpful in the creation of a third
type of worker).
150. See supra Part I.C (explaining how modern workers are classified
within the existing employee classification framework).
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promising and well conceived, these stand-alone suggestions are
inadequate on their own. Reinterpretation will only perpetuate
legal uncertainty by continuing to permit inconsistent application of the already ambiguous employee classification tests. And,
as discussed above, 151 these tests emerged from legal principles
that are now outdated and problematic in a modern context.
While one of the better suggestions, the theory of creating a third
classification will require a long, slow legislative process, leaving
the future of the gig economy open to the immediate risks of
forced employee classification. A contractual resolution is an entirely impractical suggestion, as it fails to recognize or rectify the
existing inequitable bargaining power between worker and company and would increase worker vulnerabilities and limit worker
legal protections. And this Note has already demonstrated that
existing tests only offer insufficient remedies. 152 Therefore, at
this point, there has not been a fully adequate solution proposed.
B. A COMPREHENSIVE REMEDY
Ultimately, a comprehensive remedy is required. 153 Most
importantly, this action ought to harness the unique benefits of
the gig economy. 154 It must implement durable changes that resolve present legal ambiguities. It must also strive to establish a
more reasonable balance between business and individual interests than currently exists. Thus the proposed reforms should
achieve three main objectives: preserve economic opportunity,
promote economic efficiency, and protect economic security. Congress can carry out these objectives by: (1) passing immediate
legislation that develops a legal safe harbor for gig companies,
which will preserve economic opportunity; (2) reexamining employee classification tests to minimize legal uncertainty and promote economic efficiency; and (3) creating benefit equality
among all individuals by detaching certain benefits from employ-

151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See supra Part II.
153. This Note’s three-step proposal expands on, and combines, solutions
proposed in a brief article written by economic analyst James Sherk at the Heritage Foundation and a discussion paper entitled The Hamilton Project written
by Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger at the Brookings Institution. See SHERK,
supra note 139; Harris & Krueger, supra note 8.
154. Holtz-Eakin et al., supra note 123 (“Instead of trying to limit independent work in favor of traditional work, policymakers should look for ways to harness the strengths of the gig economy so that it can continue to provide a buffer
for workers who fall on hard times.”).
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ment and requiring basic rights for all workers, which will protect future economic security.
1. Implement Immediate Safe Harbor
Congress should temporarily protect gig companies from legal uncertainty and the potentially fatal effects of forced adoption of the employee classification through enacting a safe harbor law that statutorily permits gig companies to classify
workers as either employees or independent contractors.155 This
statute would effectively shield gig companies from damaging
litigation battles and future court orders that interpret the control or economic realities tests to force employer status on gig
companies.156 This step is imperative to preserve job growth and
promote economic opportunity. By insulating emerging gig companies from this significant financial burden during their early
periods of survival and development, such legislation would allow these companies to reach rapid growth and stable maturity. 157 During this process, these companies can focus on innovation and job creation, benefitting workers and consumers.
Once better established, these companies will be prepared and
financially strong enough to withstand the burden of providing
more rights and benefits to workers.158 Though this proposal limits worker protections in the near future, this short-term handicap is far better than the alternative, which would permanently
eliminate these jobs altogether. This step seeks to put business
interests first in the short term, so that individual and business
interests can both be met in the long term.
155. See SHERK, supra note 139, at 7–8 (noting that many workers are drawn
to companies such as Uber because of the work’s independent and flexible nature).
156. See id. (“Congress should ensure that litigation does not stifle the gig
economy.”); Carlson, supra note 20, at 298. (“Our employment statutes, however, rarely accept the challenge posed by this problem. The real work of identifying ‘employees’ and their employment relationships has always been in the
courts. Statutory non-definitions, such as those in the FLSA, might well be
viewed as mandates for the courts to continue in this mission.”).
157. See generally Neil C. Churchill & Virginia L. Lewis, The Five Stages of
Small Business Growth, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 1983), https://hbr.org/1983/05/
the-five-stages-of-small-business-growth (identifying the early stages of a business as the most financially unstable).
158. Without the second step of this proposal, at this time these companies
would likely be required to classify some of their workers as employees and take
on those costs. With the second step of this proposal, these companies would
likely need to classify some workers as full employees, but the majority of gig
workers would be classified as the middle-ground third classification, to be introduced infra Section III.B.2.
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Unlike much of the existing academic literature on this
topic, this step of the proposal admittedly favors protecting gig
companies. However, this pro-business and pro-technological
strategy has been adopted by Congress in the past. In 2012, Congress implemented the JOBS (Jumpstart Our Business Startup)
Act, which relaxed SEC-imposed registration requirements for
IPOs for emerging growth companies. 159 Before that, in 1998,
Congress enacted the Internet Tax Freedom Act, which protected the informational potential of the Internet from federal,
state, and local governments imposing discriminatory Internetonly taxes. 160 These laws were passed to protect emerging businesses and harness technological advances in an effort to promote beneficial long-term growth, just as this step’s safe-harbor
provision seeks to do. Fortunately, the deregulatory agenda of
the United States’ current political leaders also make this type
of legislative action uniquely plausible at this time. 161
Logistically, this legislation should set limits on the legal
shelter so as to avoid indefinite immunity for gig companies.
Both a five-year time limit and a monetary ceiling could be implemented to allow for companies to reach stable growth before
subjecting them to full employer status. These dual limitations
would prevent companies from taking advantage of the safe harbor beyond a true need for it. Those that oppose this idea might
still contend that this safe harbor would last indefinitely, effectively neglecting gig workers permanently. However, in addition
to the proscribed financial ceiling, the next step of this proposal
would effectually end the safe harbor for gig companies and provide needed relief to gig workers.
2. Reexamine Employee Classification Tests
With a safe harbor in place to protect the gig economy, Congress should use the intervening time to thoughtfully modify the
159. Jamie Farrell, The JOBS Act: What Startups and Small Businesses
Need to Know, FORBES: WORK IN PROGRESS (Sept. 21, 2012), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/09/21/the-jobs-act-what-startups-and-small
-businesses-need-to-know-infographic. This proposal suggests using the JOBS
Act to develop parameters to define emerging gig companies.
160. JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT: IN BRIEF (Apr. 13, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43772.pdf.
161. See Anita Balakrishnan, Trump’s Labor Pick Will Be a Big Win for ‘Gig
Economy’ Start-Ups Like Uber, CNBC: TRUMPONOMICS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://
www.cnbc.com/2016/12/08/trumps-labor-pick-will-be-a-big-win-for-gig-economy
-start-ups-like-uber.html; Frank Chaparro, The Wave of Wall Street Deregulation Is Upon Us, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/
the-wave-of-financial-deregulation-is-upon-us-2017-2.
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boundaries of existing employee classification tests to better encompass gig workers. During this time, Congress can additionally clarify the factors most important in the application of these
tests so as to resolve long-existing judicial uncertainty.162 This
process would likely lead to the development of a third worker
classification, which would serve to fill the existing gap in the
employee classification tests.
A middle-ground classification, creatively labeled by others
as the “dependent contractor” classification, 163 would operate to
encompass the legal gray area between employee and independent contractor where gig workers seem to fit best. This classification could be defined by building off of, and differentiating
from, the existing classifications. Whereas employees have little
independence and employers have significant control, and independent contractors have significant independence and companies have little control over them, dependent contractors fall
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. They are characterized by increased worker independence and decreased company
control from traditional employees, while not quite reaching the
level of independent contractors. Whatever the exact parameters
of this classification, it is important that Congress not simply
create another classification with ambiguous boundaries, further complicating worker classifications.
As to the effect of this third classification, the benefits and
rights could be crafted around the implied breakdown between
legal benefits versus fundamental rights in the existing tests.
Under existing tests, employees receive both benefits and rights,
and independent contractors receive neither. Thus the third
classification, situated between these two ends of the spectrum,
would receive fundamental rights, but not benefits. This would
mean that the middle classification would receive many of the
protections afforded to employees under the economic realities
test, including minimum and fair pay, health and family leave,
and protections from discrimination under Title VII, which can

162. The tests will likely focus more on the factors of independence and control and reduce some of the extraneous factors so as to create a more uniform
application of the tests.
163. Tucciarello, supra note 113, at 369. While this is an appropriate title, it
may create confusion if the definition of dependent is not carefully explained.
For example, gig workers are not always dependent on one company. Often Uber
drivers double as drivers for their competitor, Lyft, in order to maximize their
productivity. These workers would not necessarily be dependent but should be
included among this middle-ground classification.
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be best defined as rights. 164 However, unlike employees, this new
classification would not be owed the benefits applied under the
control test, including retirement, health, and welfare benefit
plans, unionization and tax withholding. This allocation will provide gig workers with the fundamental rights that they are
owed, but, in exchange for the flexibility and independence offered by gig work, not the greater economic benefits of full employment. This creates a fair balance between gig worker and gig
company and seamlessly fills the gap between the existing classifications.165
These amendments would require a long-term, thoughtful
effort to understand and draft laws that embrace the changing
nature of the workforce in the twenty-first century. It is true that
this could take a significant amount of time, but if implemented
as part of a multi-step plan, in conjunction with the safe harbor
addressed in step one of this proposal, Congress would be able to
implement a reasonable timeline for completion. Additionally,
the strong political incentive to further create protections for gig
workers to offset the effects of the safe harbor would hopefully
force partisan compromise. Regardless of the length of time this
legislation would take to implement, this step is vitally important for the longevity of gig work, as well as all future forms
of nontraditional work. This step enhances economic efficiency
by diminishing legal uncertainty.
This step of the proposal is only effective in preserving the
gig economy if preceded by the safe harbor discussed in the first
step. Alone it could not be implemented quickly enough to protect gig companies. It is also best followed by the final step of this
proposal, which seeks to universalize employee benefits so that
they are readily available to all workers, no matter the classification.

164. See Caroline Fredrickson, Op-Ed: Is Your Uber Driver an Independent
Contractor or an Employee? It Makes a Difference, L.A. TIMES (June 5, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-fredrickson-are-uber-drivers
-independent-contractors-or-employees-20150605-story.html (“[These are]
‘basic needs,’ not bonuses: ‘They should be part of our bottom line as a society.’”).
165. See Carboni, supra note 56, at 37 (“ This third category of worker, or the
‘dependent contractor,’ seeks to lessen the burden on both the employers and
the workers in the sharing economy.”).
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3. Create Benefit Equality for All
As a very long-term goal, Congress should seek to separate
social benefits from employment, creating equal benefit opportunity for all individuals.166 This ideal would seek to strengthen
the social safety net for all individuals by guaranteeing equal
access to certain traditional employee-only benefits. 167 This
would ensure that nontraditional work forms are not disadvantaged simply because they do not fit the traditional notion of employment. Universalized benefits would help alleviate the consequences of a reduced workforce due to further technological
advances. 168 This action would also neutralize many of the key
advantages and disadvantages between existing worker classifications, which would increase legal flexibility and reduce financial incentives.169
Undoubtedly, this step of the proposal would be extremely
complex and drawn out. Getting Congress to organize, draft, and
agree on universalized benefits will likely be a development unseen for many years.170 However, this is an important step that
166. These benefits would include retirement, health and insurance benefits,
as well as equalized tax treatment. SHERK, supra note 139, at 29 (“[Congress
should] create equal benefits between the self-employed and formal employees.”); Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor
Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653, 686 (2016) (“‘[T]oo much of the welfare state is
delivered through employers . . . [it] should be tied to the individual and made
portable.’ Policy makers need to focus on a potential extension of social protection and develop new tools for ‘delivering core labor rights.’”).
167. Kristen V. Brown, How Much Would It Cost Uber to Make Drivers Employees? (Hint: It’s a Lot), SPLINTER (June 19, 2015), http://www.splinternews
.com/how-much-would-it-cost-uber-to-make-drivers-employees-1793848516
(“‘Rather than forcing full-time employment on on-demand work firms, we
should instead pursue a policy direction that creates a comparable safety net
for workers who are not full-time employees[.]’”); James Surowiecki, Gigs with
Benefits, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits (“ The bigg[est] issue here, though, is the outdated
nature of our social safety net. It’s still dependent on the idea of the full-time
employee, who gets health care, a pension, unemployment insurance, and so on
from one company. That worked fine in a world of stable employment, but lots
of Americans no longer live in that world and plenty more will be joining
them.”).
168. This is already being explored in other countries. See, e.g., Ivana
Kottasova, Finland Is Giving 2,000 Citizens a Guaranteed Income, CNN:
MONEY (Jan. 3, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/02/news/economy/finland
-universal-basic-income.
169. Harris & Krueger, supra note 8, at 15.
170. However, legislators have begun moving in this direction with the proposal of a new bill that would set aside funds for a grant program to help local
governments innovate their employment benefit systems. While this action is
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would revolutionize employment law for the betterment of the
workforce. It would permit the workforce to adapt to and sustain
any future economic changes, which will likely include an increase in innovative and nontraditional jobs. This step seeks, in
the long term, to carry out the overarching goal of this Note: to
change the dichotomous nature of the law, shifting the legal focus away from traditional employment and towards new forms
of work. Laws must embrace the future, not cling to the past. 171
CONCLUSION
The gig economy developed from a simple entrepreneurial
vision: to directly connect supply and demand. This idea has created an economic structure that transforms the way businesses,
workers, and customers interact. It has utilized technology and
creativity to provide better services for consumers and flexible
opportunities for workers. And it has fundamentally changed the
way society views employment. It has empowered workers of all
demographics by giving them a chance to provide for themselves
on their own schedule, under their own terms, and in their own
manner. It also has provided crucial economic relief by creating
job opportunities to replace disappearing traditional jobs. It has
brought necessary change to a struggling and stagnant economy.
However, the twentieth-century legal framework has posed
significant challenges to this change and threatens the existence
of the gig economy. Employment law was developed in a bygone
era when the employer-employee relationship was new and rapidly growing. Legislators were extremely concerned about employers overpowering vulnerable employees. Laws were implemented to protect these workers’ legal rights and benefits. But
they were drafted such that business interests were incompatible with individual interests. This framework is unsuitable for
the gig economy, which seeks to align business and individual

small, it is an important first step that acknowledges the need for change to
accommodate different forms of work. See Melissa Locker, A Bill That Makes It
Easier for Gig Economy Workers to Get Benefits Was Just Introduced in Congress, FAST COMPANY (May 26, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/4038971/
bill-that-makes-it-easier-for-gig-economy-workers-to-get-benefits-is-with-the
-senate.
171. See Gapper, supra note 2 (“ The task is to limit the downside of the new
economy without curtailing job growth or preventing people from working in the
way they prefer. There is a danger of romanticising the past benefits of permanent full-time employment and fixed-job contracts when many now want alternatives.”).
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interests. It forces an unsatisfactory choice between worker classifications that either protect worker rights and benefits or promotes economic growth, but cannot accomplish both.
Unsurprisingly, this has created conflict between workers
and businesses. The worker classification controversy has
played out in extensive litigation, most prominently in the recent
Uber lawsuit. While the Uber case offers a single straightforward example, this issue affects millions of workers and many
promising gig companies. Often, other affected companies are
smaller and significantly more fragile than Uber, making them
more susceptible to this issue. This widespread conflict has
forced to the forefront of legal discussion a single question: how
can laws best protect workers, while at the same time harnessing the benefits of the gig economy?
This Note has proposed a comprehensive answer to that
question. The answer provides a sustainable three-step approach that protects the future of the gig economy in the short,
long, and very long term. Together, these three proposals compose a legal regime that reasonably balances business and individual interests. The initial proposal requires swift action to prevent permanent financial damage to the gig economy, securing
job opportunities, and supporting technological innovation. The
second proposal asks for a diligent review and redrafting of employment laws and classification tests in light of changes in the
modern workforce. The final proposal advocates for a transformation of the social welfare system that guarantees economic security for all individuals and reduces corresponding financial incentives for businesses. These three proposals seek to confront
the legal challenges raised by the gig economy in such a way that
embraces innovation and growth without exploiting workers.
At a time when courts are struggling to classify gig workers,
gig companies are unsure of their future, and gig workers are
demanding answers, it is critical now, at this crucial point, that
next steps taken efficiently and effectively support the future of
the gig economy. The success of the gig economy depends on it.
If we are not careful, we will kill the goose that has laid the
golden egg.

